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The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act1 of
2010 introduced the most sweeping reforms of financial markets since the
Great Depression. Nestled among its numerous provisions was the
amendment to Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
expressly authorizing the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to
adopt rules for shareholders to nominate directors to the boards of reporting
companies.2 Financial institutions had long lobbied the SEC for a rule
providing shareholders access to the nominating process of publicly held
corporations.3 Their cause gained momentum with a 2003 SEC staff report
recommending that large, long-term holders, under very limited
circumstances, should have the right to nominate a minority of the directors
to be elected.4 After that report, a battle royal ensued, a pro-access chairman
was terminated, and under the new SEC chairman, the SEC sidetracked
shareholder access and even curbed the institutions’ access to the proxy
machinery as a means to authorize shareholder nominations to the board.5
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1. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
2. Id. § 971. The amendment provided:
(2) The rules and regulations prescribed by the Commission under paragraph (1)
may include—
(A) a requirement that a solicitation of proxy, consent, or authorization
by (or on behalf of) an issuer include a nominee submitted by a shareholder to
serve on the board of directors of the issuer; and
(B) a requirement that an issuer follow a certain procedure in relation to
a solicitation described in subparagraph (A).
Id.
3. See, e.g., S.E.C. Sued Over Board Nomination Rule for Investors, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK
(Sept. 30, 2010, 4:26 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/09/30/s-e-c-sued-over-boardnomination-rule-for-investors (highlighting the lobbying efforts of public pension funds).
4. Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,626, Investment
Company Act Release No. 26,206, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60,787 (proposed Oct. 23, 2003).
5. The SEC interpreted its shareholder proposal provision, Rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a8(i)(8) (2005), to permit companies to omit a bylaw proposal setting forth a procedure by which
stockholders could nominate directors because the proposal related to the election of directors. Am.
Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps. v. AIG, 462 F.3d 121, 126 (2d Cir. 2006). The Second Circuit
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Then, with the imprimatur of Dodd-Frank,6 the SEC acted, albeit timidly, to
provide, in Rule 14a-11, a process for limited shareholder board nominations.
In broad overview, Rule 14a-11 permitted a shareholder or group of
shareholders that held at least three percent of the voting power for over three
years to nominate a maximum of twenty-five percent of the board.7
Institutions rejoiced, but only briefly; Rule 14a-11 never became operative.
The rule was immediately challenged, and the SEC suspended its effect until
the legal dispute was resolved.8
In Business Roundtable v. SEC,9 the D.C. Circuit ultimately invalidated
Rule 14a-11, holding that the SEC acted arbitrarily and capriciously in
adopting it.10 In so ruling, the D.C. Circuit followed a now familiar path of
invalidating SEC rulemaking efforts on the ground that the SEC failed to
meet the review standard11 (hereinafter Review Standard), which mandates
that “the Commission shall . . . consider, in addition to the protection of
investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and
capital formation.”12 Previously this provision was invoked by the D.C.
Circuit to invalidate SEC rules calling for seventy-five percent of a registered

Court of Appeals rejected the SEC’s position. Id. at 129–30. Thereupon the SEC amended the rule
to expressly authorize excluding a proposal if it “relates to a nomination” of a director. Shareholder
Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, Exchange Act Release No. 56,914, Investment
Company Act Release No. 28,075, 72 Fed. Reg. 70,450, 70,456 (Dec. 11, 2007) (codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 240). Earlier the SEC had proposed two conflicting approaches regarding shareholder
nominations. Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 56,160, Investment Company Act
Release No. 27,913, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,466, 43,466 (proposed Aug. 3, 2007) (creating a device to
allow inclusion of shareholder proposals in a company’s proxy statement); id. at 43,487 (proposing
an amendment to proxy rules that would exclude shareholder proposals from the company’s proxy
statement “[i]f the proposal relates to a nomination or an election for membership on the company’s
board of directors or analogous governing body or a procedure for such nomination or election”).
States have not been idle in this debate. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 112, 113 (2011)
(authorizing bylaws providing for the nomination of directors by shareholders and reimbursement of
such nominees’ election expenses); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.06(c) (2010) (providing for
authorization of the same). Cf. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227 (Del.
2008) (holding a stockholder-proposed bylaw calling for reimbursement of an insurgent’s
reasonable proxy expenses was a proper subject for shareholder action because it related to the
process of carrying out the limited shareholder franchise).
6. See infra notes 161–62 and accompanying text.
7. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 9136, Exchange
Act Release No. 62,764, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,384, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668,
56,674–75 (Sept. 16, 2010).
8. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 9151,
Exchange Act Release No. 63,109, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,462, 75 Fed. Reg.
64,641, 64,641 (Oct. 20, 2010) (announcing that effective and compliance dates for amendments to,
inter alia, 17 C.F.R. pt. 240 would be indefinitely delayed until further notice).
9. 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
10. Id. at 1156.
11. Id. at 1148.
12. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2006). The three other major
securities laws administered by the SEC contain the same Review Standard. See Securities Act of
1933 § 2(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2006); Investment Company Act of 1940 § 2(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a2(c) (2006); Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(c) (2006).
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mutual fund board, including the board chairman, to be independent of the
fund’s investment advisor,13 and classifying so-called fixed indexed annuities
so that they would no longer enjoy an exemption from the Securities Act.14
In holding that the SEC failed to fulfill the statutory Review Standard
when considering the impact of Rule 14a-11 on efficiency, competition, and
capital formation, Business Roundtable summarized the SEC’s faults as
follows:
Here the Commission inconsistently and opportunistically framed the
costs and benefits of the rule; failed adequately to quantify the certain
costs or to explain why those costs could not be quantified; neglected
to support its predictive judgments; contradicted itself; and failed to
respond to substantial problems raised by commenters.15
It is not our purpose here to disagree with any of these evidentiary
conclusions. What we report here is that the level of review invoked by the
D.C. Circuit in Business Roundtable and its earlier decisions is dramatically
inconsistent with the standard enacted by Congress. Our conclusion is that
the D.C. Circuit has assumed for itself a role opposed to the one Congress
prescribed for courts reviewing SEC rules.
I.

The Review Standard According to the D.C. Circuit

Business Roundtable is distinctive in its close review of the SEC’s
failings in the agency’s consideration and adoption of Rule 14a-11. We
summarize in this paragraph the most notable points raised in Judge
Ginsburg’s opinion. We do this to provide a fully textured understanding of
what the D.C. Circuit believes is required by the mandate that the SEC
consider a rule’s impact on efficiency, competition, and capital formation.
Rising from a close review of the decision is the D.C. Circuit’s view that
SEC rulemaking must attempt, if not complete, an accurate cost–benefit
determination.
Thus, Judge Ginsburg faults the SEC’s cost–benefit
assessments because they “had no basis beyond mere speculation”16 or
because the SEC failed “to estimate and quantify the costs it expected
companies to incur.”17 Based on these identified failings, the D.C. Circuit
observed that “the Commission has not sufficiently supported its conclusion
that increasing the potential for election of directors nominated by
shareholders will result in improved board and company performance and

13. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 142–44 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The D.C. Circuit
heard a second challenge to the same rule, but that decision did not apply or analyze the statutory
Review Standard regarding efficiency, competition, and capital formation. See Chamber of
Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890, 894 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (stating that the focus was on whether the
Commission relied on material not in the rulemaking record in deciding not to modify the rule).
14. Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 167–68 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
15. Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1148–49.
16. Id. at 1150.
17. Id.
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shareholder value.”18 In areas where the SEC discounted the costs associated
with its rule, the D.C. Circuit condemned that reasoning as “illogical and, in
an economic analysis, unacceptable.”19 A good illustration of the opinion’s
requirement that costs and benefits be assessed is its rebuke of the SEC for
failing to consider, “[i]n weighing the rule’s costs and benefits,” the extent to
which the new rule would “take the place of traditional proxy contests.”20 As
the court explained, “[w]ithout this crucial datum, the Commission has no
way of knowing whether the rule will facilitate enough election contests to
be of net benefit.”21
Until very recent years, SEC-adopted rules enjoyed a blissful existence
before the D.C. Circuit.22 The turning point came in 2005 when, in Chamber
of Commerce v. SEC,23 the Chamber challenged rules the SEC adopted under
the Investment Company Act that exempted otherwise prohibited
transactions if at least seventy-five percent of a mutual fund’s board of
directors, and the board’s chair, were independent.24 The SEC broadly stated
that it did not expect the exemption “to have a significant effect on
efficiency, competition and capital formation” in light of the fact that “many
funds [had] already adopted the required practices.”25 The SEC did
acknowledge that the rule would entail quantifiable costs, but it was
confident there would be unquestionable benefits.26
Chamber of Commerce, another opinion authored by Judge Ginsburg,
held that the SEC violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) with
regards to considering the costs of the new rules.27 For both rules, the SEC

18. Id. at 1151.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1153.
21. Id. (emphasis added).
22. This view of the quiet life the SEC earlier enjoyed before the D.C. Circuit has been
previously explored by one of the authors. See James D. Cox, Premises for Reforming the
Regulation of Securities Offerings: An Essay, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 11, 37–39 (2000)
(noting that with the exception of an earlier decision on another matter by the Business Roundtable,
“[f]ew decisions have seriously questioned the validity of an SEC rule”). We distinguish the cases
discussed in this article from the earlier reversal the SEC suffered in Business Roundtable, which
held that the SEC lacked the substantive authority to impose a one-share, one-vote requirement for
public companies. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1990). None of the cases
reviewed here held that the SEC lacked the substantive authority to regulate the matter at issue.
23. 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
24. Id. at 136–37. The SEC enacted these rules, by a split vote of three to two, under the
Investment Company Act. See Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act
Release No. 26,520, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378, 46,378, 46,390 (Aug. 2, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
pt. 270) (adopting amendments to the Investment Company Act over the dissent of two
commissioners).
25. Investment Company Governance, 69 Fed. Reg. at 46,388.
26. See id. at 46,386–87 (analyzing the costs and benefits of the amendments to the Investment
Company Act).
27. See Chamber of Commerce, 412 F.3d at 144 (“In sum, the Commission violated its
obligation under 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(c), and therefore the APA, in failing adequately to consider the
costs imposed upon funds by the two challenged conditions.”).
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stated, as part of its announcement of the final rules, that it would be difficult
to quantify the potential costs for a fund to comply.28 The court stated that
this uncertainty did “not excuse the Commission from its statutory obligation
to determine as best it can the economic implications of the rule it has
proposed.”29 The court reasoned that “uncertainty . . . does not excuse the
Commission from its statutory obligation to do what it can to apprise itself—
and hence the public and the Congress—of the economic consequences of a
proposed regulation before it decides whether to adopt the measure.”30 Thus,
the court held that “the Commission violated its obligation under [the
Investment Company Act], and therefore the APA, in failing adequately to
consider the costs imposed upon funds by the two challenged conditions.”31
Significantly, the D.C. Circuit in Chamber of Commerce faulted the
SEC for its failure to consider, as suggested in dissents by two
commissioners, disclosure of director independence in place of mandating
independence.32 The court, however, qualified this basis for faulting the SEC
by characterizing the alternative of disclosure as “a familiar tool in the
Commission’s tool kit.”33 On the other hand, the SEC obtained a potentially
significant victory; the court quickly dismissed the Chamber’s argument that
the SEC was required either to develop new data to support its rule, or to
fully consider each of the empirical studies before it as a result of the
voluminous comments filed during the proposal process.34 Thus, the court
concluded that the SEC is under no obligation to premise its rulemaking on
empirical findings.35 The court also noted that the Commission’s failure to

28. See id. at 143 (“With respect to the 75% independent director condition, the Commission
. . . claimed it was without a ‘reliable basis for determining how funds would choose to satisfy the
[condition] and therefore it [was] difficult to determine the costs associated with electing
independent directors.’ . . . With respect to the costs of the independent chairman condition,
counsel maintains the Commission ‘was not aware of any costs associated with the hiring of staff
because boards typically have this authority under state law, and the rule would not require them to
hire employees.’” (citations omitted)).
29. Id. (emphasis added).
30. Id. at 144.
31. Id. To support its conclusion, the court cited to a single case—its own decision in Public
Citizen v. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, 374 F.3d 1209 (D.C. Cir. 2004)—for the
proposition that, even in the “face of uncertainty, [an] agency must ‘exercise its expertise to make
tough choices about which of the competing estimates is most plausible, and to hazard a guess as to
which is correct, even if . . . the estimate will be imprecise.’” Chamber of Commerce, 412 F.3d at
143 (quoting Pub. Citizen, 374 F.3d at 1221).
32. See Chamber of Commerce, 412 F.3d at 144 (“We conclude the Commission’s failure to
consider the disclosure alternative violated the APA.”).
33. Id.
34. See id. at 142 (“[A]lthough we recognize that an agency acting upon the basis of empirical
data may more readily be able to show it has satisfied its obligations under the APA, . . . we are
acutely aware that an agency need not—indeed cannot—base its every action upon empirical
data . . . .” (citations omitted)).
35. See id. at 142–43 (holding that the Commission did not violate the APA by declining to
conduct its own empirical study or by failing to closely consider a study offered to it via the noticeand-comment process, given that the SEC identified problems with the study).
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conduct its own empirical study of the potential costs of the proposed rule
was not arbitrary and capricious, given that the Commission based its
conclusion as to the benefits of the new rules on “its own and its staff’s
experience, the many comments received, and other evidence, in addition to
the limited and conflicting empirical evidence.”36
In American Equity Investment Life Insurance Co. v. SEC,37 the D.C.
Circuit was again asked to determine whether the SEC had satisfactorily
considered whether newly adopted Rule 151A would promote efficiency,
competition, and capital formation.38 The newly adopted rule disqualified
fixed indexed annuities from falling within the definition of an annuity
contract under Section 3(a)(8) of the Securities Act of 1933.39 An indexed
annuity credits its purchaser with a rate of return based on the performance of
an identified securities index, such as the Standard and Poor’s Industrial 500
Index.40 Pursuant to the newly minted Rule 151A, such annuities would no
longer be exempt from the registration requirements of the Securities Act.41
Invoking the earlier Chamber of Commerce reasoning, American Equity
argued that the costs of implementing Rule 151A were too burdensome and
that imposing the additional regulation would be inefficient.42 In response,
the SEC justified the change by reasoning that Rule 151A would “bring
about clarity in what [had] been an uncertain area of law.”43 The SEC thus
believed reducing the uncertain status of indexed annuities was a benefit unto
itself, further reasoning that the enhanced disclosures that would accompany
the securities classification for this financial product would result in
increased price transparency and market depth—each thereby favorably
impacting efficiency, competition, and capital formation.44
The D.C. Circuit faulted the SEC’s consideration of “competition.”45
The court noted that while the SEC claimed to have analyzed Rule 151A’s
potential effects on competition, the Commission disclosed no reasoned basis
for its conclusion.46 The court rejected the SEC’s argument that the rule’s
adoption would “bring about clarity in . . . an uncertain area of law” so that

36. Id. at 142 (quoting Investment Company Governance, 69 Fed. Reg. at 46,383).
37. 613 F.3d 166 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
38. Id. at 167.
39. Id. at 167–68.
40. Id. at 168.
41. See id. at 167 (“As a result of this new rule, [fixed indexed annuities] are subject to the full
panoply of requirements set forth by the Act . . . .”).
42. Id. at 177.
43. Id. (quoting Indexed Annuities and Certain Other Insurance Contracts, Securities Act
Release No. 8996, Exchange Act Release No. 59,221, 74 Fed. Reg. 3138, 3171 (Jan. 16, 2009)
(codified in part at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
44. Id.
45. See id. (“We hold that the Commission’s consideration of the effect of Rule 151A on . . .
competition . . . was arbitrary and capricious.”).
46. See id. (“The SEC purports to have analyzed the effect of the rule on competition, but does
not disclose a reasoned basis for its conclusion that Rule 151A would increase competition.”).
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competition would be enhanced by encouraging more parties to enter the
marketplace for fixed indexed annuities.47 The court concluded that this
reasoning was flawed, reasoning that the SEC could adopt any rule—whether
this one or a completely different one—and that act would necessarily bring
about clarity.48 The mere fact that a rule might bring about “clarity” was not,
in itself, “helpful in assessing the effect Rule 151A [would have] on
competition.”49 The court concluded that, at most, the SEC’s reasoning
would support the proposition that any new SEC rule in this area “could
promote competition” by bringing about clarity in an uncertain legal field;
however, this was not sufficient to show what effect the specific rule at issue,
Rule 151A, would have on competition.50
The SEC further sought to justify new Rule 151A on the ground that it
would increase competition because it “would require fuller public disclosure
of [fixed indexed annuities] and thereby increase price transparency.”51 The
D.C. Circuit rejected this rationale, finding the SEC’s competition analysis
failed because the Commission “did not make any finding on the existing
level of [price] competition in the marketplace under the state law regime”
and thus “did not assess the baseline level of price transparency and
information disclosure under state law.”52 As a result of this failure, “[t]he
SEC could not accurately assess any potential increase or decrease in
competition.”53 This basis for the D.C. Circuit’s opinion is very similar to
the bases invoked in Chamber of Commerce regarding the SEC’s failure to
consider state regulation as an alternative to the federal disclosure regime, as
both disclosure and state regulation are “familiar tools” in the investor
protection “tool kit.”54 With similar effect, the court concluded in American
Equity that the SEC’s analysis of the rule’s impact on competition was
“arbitrary and capricious because it failed to consider the extent of the
existing competition in its analysis.”55 The court, referencing its earlier
holding in Chamber of Commerce, stated that by calling on the SEC to
consider whether a rule would promote efficiency, competition, and capital
formation, Congress imposed on “the SEC an obligation to consider the
economic implications of certain rules it proposes.”56

47. Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
48. Id. at 177–78. As the court observed, the Review Standard did not call for the SEC to
consider “whether any rule would have an effect on competition,” but rather “whether the specific
rule will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.” Id. at 178 (emphasis in original).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. (emphasis added).
53. Id.
54. See Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (characterizing
disclosure as “a familiar tool in the Commission’s tool kit”).
55. 613 F.3d at 178.
56. Id.
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With respect to Rule 151A’s impact on efficiency, the SEC’s
justification fared no better than its other arguments. In adopting Rule 151A,
the SEC stated that increased price transparency would promote efficiency,
arguing that the heightened disclosures flowing from registration as a
consequence of Rule 151A would enable investors to make better-informed
decisions in the investment-products marketplace.57 The court concluded
that this analysis was insufficient because the SEC failed to consider
whether, under existing regulations (principally those mandated by state
law), investors were already able to make well-informed decisions.58 In
other words, the SEC’s reasoning was arbitrary and capricious because it
failed “to analyze the efficiency of the existing state law regime.”59
Finally, the court concluded that the SEC’s “capital formation”
reasoning was arbitrary and capricious because the Commission’s analysis of
this factor depended heavily on its (allegedly) flawed assumption that Rule
151A’s increased investor protections would increase market efficiency.60
II.

Congress and the Review Standard

For most of its life, the principal governors on the SEC’s rulemaking
authority were the requirement that its rules be “necessary or appropriate in
the public interest,” and the need to consider whether the rule would advance
the goal of “protection of investors.”61 In 1996, Congress enacted the
National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 (NSMIA) and added
the requirement that the SEC “also consider, in addition to the protection of
investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and
capital formation.”62 In introducing the Review Standard, Congress left
undefined the terms “consider,” “efficiency,” “competition,” and “capital
formation,” and, far more importantly, did not explain what level of

57. Id. at 178–79.
58. Id. at 179.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Although this combination of requirements was formally applied by statute to the SEC’s
general rulemaking authority in 1996, the provisions were applied to many of the SEC’s rulemaking
powers since the early years of the Commission. Compare National Securities Market
Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 106(b), 110 Stat. 3416, 3424 (1996) (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2006)) (applying this combination of requirements to the SEC’s general
rulemaking authority), with 15 U.S.C. § 79e(a) (Supp. IV 1938) (permitting the SEC, subject to
those two restrictions, to utilize rules and regulations concerning the form of applications for
registering as a holding company), and 15 U.S.C. § 79j(a) (Supp. I 1935) (permitting the SEC,
subject to those two restrictions, to utilize rules and regulations regarding the form of applications
for acquiring securities or capital assets).
62. National Securities Markets Improvement Act § 106. Oddly, NSMIA added the Review
Standard only to the Securities Act of 1933 § 2(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2006), the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2006), and the Investment Company Act of 1940
§ 2(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(c) (2006). In 1999, Congress added similar language to the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(c)(2006). Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No.
106-102, § 224, 113 Stat. 1338, 1402 (1999).
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consideration the SEC was required to give these items when engaged in
rulemaking.63 Most of the focus of the legislative history was directed to the
central substantive changes NSMIA introduced—namely, preempting much
of the states’ role in the registration of public offerings of securities.64
Nonetheless, insights into the breadth of the new requirement arise from the
somewhat tortured path that the Review Standard traveled through the
legislative process.
We believe the strongest indication of the level of assessment mandated
by the Review Standard is what was initially adopted by the Senate but
abandoned in conference with the House. The Senate’s competing bill,
Senate Bill 1815, required the SEC’s Chief Economist to prepare a report on
the potential consequences of a proposed regulation.65 The report would
provide “an analysis of the likely effects of the proposed regulation on the
economy of the United States, and particularly upon the securities markets
and the participants in those markets.”66 The report was to contain “the
estimated impact of the proposed regulation upon economic and market
behavior, including any impact on market liquidity, the costs of investment,
and the financial risks of investment.”67 In the hearings on the bill, this
provision enjoyed a cool reception. SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt believed
the then-existing notice and comment procedure itself, without more,
provided sufficient means to assess the burdens of any regulatory action;
moreover, he argued against any assessment being made on a rule-by-rule
basis, believing that the efforts of economists were “better directed toward
analyzing the larger economic context and thematic issues that cut across
markets” so that a market-by-market approach would be more useful.68 The
only other testimony concerning the Senate’s version cautioned that any
review standard would be opposed if it placed undue burdens on the SEC.69
Nonetheless, the Senate bill retained this version of the review standard;
indeed, the report accompanying the Senate’s passage of the bill described its
review standard as calling on the SEC to “demonstrate serious economic
analysis throughout the process of developing regulations.”70 At the same

63. National Securities Markets Improvement Act § 106.
64. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. E1928–29 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1996) (speech of Rep. Thomas J.
Bliley, Jr., Chairman, House Committee on Commerce) (discussing NSMIA’s preemption of state
authority over securities offerings and claiming disparate state laws hindered competition); H.R.
REP. NO. 104-864, at 39–40 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3920, 3920–21
(discussing NSMIA’s preemption of state authority concerning regulating securities offerings).
65. Securities Investment Promotion Act of 1996, S. 1815, 104th Cong. § 310(b)(1) (1996).
66. Id. § 310(b)(2)(A).
67. Id. § 310(b)(2)(B).
68. The Securities Investment Promotion Act of 1996: Hearing on S. 1815 Before S. Comm. on
Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 104th Cong. 47 (1996) (statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman,
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n).
69. Id. at 147 (statement of Paul Saltzman, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Public
Securities Association).
70. S. REP. NO. 104-293, at 16 (1996).
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time, the overall thrust of the bill was, according to the report, that of
achieving better balance between investor protection and the cost of
investing through the preemption of much of the state regulation of public
offerings.71
The Senate’s review language disappeared in the conference convened
to reconcile the differences between the House and Senate bills;72 the original
language of the House bill carried the day and became law as part of
NSMIA.73 The conferees apparently preferred the House’s loosely worded,
indefinite language to the more precise, quantitatively driven approach
approved by the Senate. Most importantly, in rejecting the Senate’s
approach, the conferees also rejected a cost–benefit assessment for each
proposed SEC rule. At the same time, it is not clear from the rest of the scant
legislative history just how the SEC’s rulemaking practices were to be
changed by the NSMIA, if at all, from what the practices were before.
The Report accompanying the House’s version of NSMIA sheds modest
light on the content of the Review Standard. First, it expresses an
expectation that “[t]he Committee expects that the Commission will engage
in rigorous analysis pursuant to this section.”74 Second, it announces that
when considering efficiency, competition, and capital formation, “the
Commission shall analyze the potential costs and benefits of any rulemaking
initiative, including, whenever practicable, specific analysis of such costs and
benefits.”75
While this language suggests more, indeed much more, would be
required of the SEC in rulemaking than was the prior practice, a
contemporary neutral assessment of the provision by the Congressional
Budget Office concluded that “[b]ecause the SEC currently conducts cost–
benefit analyses in conjunction with its rulemakings,”76 the “CBO would not
expect this provision to result in any additional costs to the federal
government.”77
Moreover, the House Report states that “[t]he legislation also seeks to
promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation in the capital markets
without compromising investor protection by . . . requiring the consideration
of efficiency, competition, and capital formation whenever the Securities and
Exchange Commission . . . makes a public interest determination in its

71. See id. at 2 (summarizing the report to follow).
72. Compare H.R. REP. NO. 104-864, at 27 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) with Securities Investment
Promotion Act of 1996, S. 1815, 104th Cong. § 310(b) (1996).
73. Compare Securities Amendments of 1996, H.R. 3005, 104th Cong. (as passed by House,
June 19, 1996) with H.R. REP. NO. 104-864, at 10 and National Securities Market Improvement Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 106, 110 Stat. 3416, 3424 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b,
78c(f), 80a-2(c) (2006)).
74. H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 39 (1996) (emphasis added).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 24.
77. Id.
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rulemaking.”78 The report further adds that the triple considerations of
efficiency, competition, and capital formation were to be “consistent with the
public interest and investor protection.”79
Thus while inviting “rigorous analysis” by the SEC per the Review
Standard, the House Report also stated that for the life of the SEC, “the
foremost mission of the Commission has been investor protection, and this
section does not alter the Commission’s mission.”80
Further, there is significant circumstantial evidence suggesting that
Congress must not have intended the Review Standard to be especially
demanding on the SEC. Looking just at the language of the statute, the
operative verb in the Review Standard is “consider”: the Review Standard
does not require the SEC to “determine” whether a rule will actually promote
efficiency, competition, or capital formation. In fact, Congress included a
“determination” requirement in the first draft of the provision, then removed
it in subsequent versions.81
The contemporary meaning of “consider” suggests that if, after
“considering” whether a proposed rule would “promote efficiency,
competition, and capital formation,” the SEC concludes that it would not
promote those goals, the Review Standard does not require the SEC to
abandon the rule. Indeed, the plain import of the Review Standard is that it
does not require the SEC to come to a conclusion about a proposed rule’s
effect on efficiency, competition, and capital formation; it does not prevent
adoption of a rule because of indeterminacy of the rule’s impact. For that
matter, the plain language of the Review Standard does not require the SEC
to state a strong reason why a rule should be passed even if, upon
consideration, it appears the rule would not promote efficiency, competition,
or capital formation.
Nowhere in the legislative history did any member of Congress ever
specify, or even suggest, exactly how the SEC should go about “considering”
the enumerated factors, nor did any member ever specify exactly what aspect
of “efficiency,” “competition,” or “capital formation” the SEC should
consider. (For example, does “efficiency” mean “efficiency of the capital
markets”? How is that distinct from “competition”? What if a proposed rule
might promote “efficiency,” but not promote “capital formation”? The
legislative history leaves these questions unanswered.) What is stated in the
legislative history is that the SEC’s “consideration” is to entail rigorous
analysis and evaluation of the potential costs and benefits of the proposed
rule.82 This is not the same as mandating that the rule must be justified

78. Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
79. Id. at 38.
80. Id. at 39 (emphasis added).
81. See H.R. 2131, 104th Cong. § 8(b) (1995) (requiring the SEC to consider or determine
whether an action will “promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation”).
82. See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text.
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because it meets each of the considerations of efficiency, competition, and
capital formation, or requiring that the rule, in the language of Business
Roundtable, yield a net benefit.83
Further evidence that Congress did not intend the Review Standard to
impose significant changes in the criteria by which to judge SEC rulemaking
occurred in 1999 when Congress added the Review Standard to the
Investment Advisers Act.84 Interestingly, this apparent oversight was
corrected through a conforming amendment to the much more significant
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,85 which repealed the Glass-Steagall Act, the
cornerstone of financial regulation since the Great Depression.86 Thus, the
primary thrust of the legislative effort was to overhaul regulation of the
financial services industry and not to update SEC rulemaking procedures.87
In the conference report accompanying the bill, the conferees rebuked the
SEC for not doing a satisfactory job in implementing the Review Standard
earlier enacted in the NSMIA.88 However, the conferees gave no specific
examples of the failures causing their unhappiness;89 hence, their rebuke
appears hollow, as Congress later added the same Review Standard the
conferees were complaining about to the Investment Advisers Act. Despite
many hearing appearances by SEC Chairman Levitt and staff members in
connection with the 1999 legislation,90 the hearings and other portions of the
legislative history of the 1999 legislation are devoid of any reports on the
SEC’s discharge or noncompliance with the Review Standard. In the end,
the same Review Standard as earlier enacted in NSMIA was included in the
Investment Advisers Act.
As seen from the above, the legislative history of the Review Standard
is far from conclusive or clear on the intensity of the review mandated by the
NSMIA. On the one hand, there is evidence from the House Commerce
Committee’s report stating the Committee’s expectation that the SEC would
engage in “rigorous analysis,” and that the SEC would quantify and analyze
with specificity the costs and benefits of a proposed rule.91 Further, when the

83. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
84. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-12, § 224, 113 Stat. 1338, 1402 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 80b-2(c) (2006)) (incorporating the Review Standard into § 202 of the Investment
Advisers Act).
85. Id.
86. RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
18 (4th ed. 2009) (calling the Glass-Steagall Act a “centerpiece of American banking policy”
between its enactment in 1933 and its later repeal).
87. See KENNETH R. BENSON ET AL., FINANCIAL SERVICES MODERNIZATION: GRAHAMLEACH-BLILEY ACT OF 1999, LAW AND EXPLANATION 3, 21 (1999) (summarizing the main
purposes of the Graham-Leach-Bliley Act, none of which include updating SEC rulemaking
procedures).
88. H.R. REP. NO. 106-434, at 165 (1999) (Conf. Rep.).
89. See id. at 164–65.
90. H.R. REP. NO. 106-74, pt. 3, at 120 (1999).
91. See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text.
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House was considering adopting the Conference Report, House Commerce
Committee Chairman Bliley stated (erroneously) that the provision would
“require the SEC to conduct meaningful cost–benefit analysis of proposed”
rules.92 In the Conference Report for the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the
conferees claimed disappointment with SEC compliance with the new
provisions.93 And, many witnesses in the House subcommittee hearings on
the NSMIA’s precursor testified to their belief that more serious SEC
consideration should be statutorily required in the rulemaking context.94
Perhaps most enlightening is Congress’s failure to act even when it
claimed dissatisfaction with how the SEC implemented the NSMIA. When it
added the “promote efficiency” consideration requirements to the Investment
Advisers Act, Congress had an opportunity to hold hearings in which it could
criticize the SEC’s implementation of the NSMIA. It did not do so.
Congress also had the opportunity to modify the language added to the
Investment Advisers Act and to modify the language in the other statutes.
Instead, it chose to use the same language once again.95
Further insight into the level of assessment Congress imposed on the
SEC through the Review Standard is suggested by Congress’s enactment of
an amendment, also as part of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, that set forth a
very different review standard for rules promulgated by the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).96 That standard called on the CFTC
to “consider the costs and benefits of the action” and provided that “[t]he
costs and benefits . . . shall be evaluated in light of . . . considerations of the
efficiency, competitiveness, and financial integrity of futures markets.”97
The very different language used for the CFTC—namely, the express
call for the CFTC to “consider the costs and benefits” of rules, as well as the
clear implication of Congress’s embracement of a more demanding standard
for the CFTC than for the SEC—further supports the view that Congress,
when it wished for costs and benefits to be assessed, certainly knew how to
impose that requirement for an agency’s rulemaking. Moreover, the fact that

92. 142 CONG. REC. 25,810 (1996) (statement of Rep. Thomas Bliley).
93. H.R. REP. NO. 106-434, at 165.
94. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 16 (describing the witness testimony before the
subcommittee as indicating a need for modernization of the SEC’s regulatory scheme to avoid
inefficient, costly, and duplicitous rules that fail to adequately protect investors).
95. Compare Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. 106-102, § 224, 113 Stat. 1338, 1402 (1999)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(c) (2006)) with National Securities Market Improvement Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 106(a), 110 Stat. 3416, 3424 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b)
(2006)).
96. S. 257, 105th Cong. § 11 (as introduced on Feb. 4, 1997).
97. H.R. 5660, 106th Cong. § 119 (2000) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 19(a) (2006)) (enacted by
incorporation by reference in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554,
§ 1(a)(5), 114 Stat. 2763, 2763 (2000)). The only reference in the legislative history to this change
states generally that the standard calls on the CFTC to consider costs and benefits of its actions and
that the standard does not apply to investigative or emergency actions. H.R. REP. NO. 106-711,
pt. 1, at 40 (2000); H.R. REP. NO. 106-711, pt. 3, at 59 (2000); S. REP. NO. 106-390, at 13 (2000).
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Congress imposed the more demanding language on the CFTC at the same
time that it extended the earlier NSMIA standard to the Investment Advisers
Act suggests not only a consciousness that the two agencies operated under
different standards, but also that Congress knew how to express a more
demanding standard when it wanted to do so and therefore suggests that
Congress consciously chose to impose two very different standards on the
agencies. As seen earlier, the NSMIA conferees rejected and eliminated the
requirement, found in Senate Bill 1815, that the SEC Chief Economist
prepare a report on the economic consequences of a proposed rule—
including its effect on the market and market participants—and publish that
report before adopting the rule.98 Had the Congress that enacted GrammLeach-Bliley truly wanted the SEC to do more in compliance with the
Review Standard, it could have amended the Review Standard’s
requirements to be on more of a scale of Senate Bill 1815; it did not. And,
despite House Report 104-622 and Representative Bliley’s statements to the
contrary, the Review Standard (that is, the language Congress actually
adopted) does not explicitly require the SEC to specify the costs of any
proposed rule, to engage in rigorous analysis, or even to engage in cost–
benefit analysis.
Given this conflict in the legislative history, and given that the purpose
of the enacting legislation was primarily to modify the allocation of
responsibilities between federal and state regulatory entities (or, in the case
of the provisions added to the Investment Advisers Act, to repeal GlassSteagall), it seems unlikely that the Review Standard was truly designed to
establish more than a thoughtful analysis of the proposed rule’s potential
effects. Certainly, it was not designed to require the SEC to conclude, as
Business Roundtable states, that the rule yields a “net benefit.”99
III. Outside the Shadow of Precedent
A.

The Supreme Court’s Tapestry for Judicial Review

The leading authority for judicial review of agency action is Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC,100 which embraces a two-step analysis.101 Step one
asks whether the agency had the authority to act, and step two considers
whether the agency permissibly exercised the authority Congress granted
it.102 It is under this latter step that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
enters the scene. Under the APA, a court can invalidate an agency-made rule

98. See supra notes 65–72 and accompanying text.
99. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
100. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
101. See id. at 843 (describing the two steps required by the newly minted analysis).
102. See id. at 842–43 (“Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to [a] specific
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.”).

2012]

The Emperor Has No Clothes

1825

if it concludes the rule is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law.”103 “Hard look” review has become
the name of the game: courts subject an agency’s rule to rather rigorous
analysis to ensure the rule is the product of reasoned decisionmaking—that
the rule is a product of sound reason rather than being “arbitrary and
capricious.”104 The Supreme Court famously generalized this test in Motor
Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co.105:
Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the
agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to
the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not
be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise.106
Thus, the quality and coherence of the agency’s reasoning is the focus
of judicial review under hard look. And this makes sense; as noted by one
commentator on administrative law, the hard look requirement helps courts
ensure that an agency is not exceeding its mandate or the bounds of its
statutory authority with a particular rule.107
While the agency’s reasoning is fair game under hard look review, the
specific procedures that the agency uses to arrive at its final rule are not. In
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC108 the Court struck down the
D.C. Circuit’s attempt to require an agency to satisfy extra-statutory
procedural requirements before enacting a new rule.109 The Court tempered
its ruling by stating, “[t]his is not to say necessarily that there are no
circumstances which would ever justify a court in overturning agency action
because of a failure to employ procedures beyond those required by the
statute,” but the Court ultimately concluded, “such circumstances, if they
exist, are extremely rare.”110 First enunciated in the context of agency
adjudication, the rule from Vermont Yankee had a dramatic effect on judicial
review of agency rulemaking, stopping courts from imposing extra-statutory

103. Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
104. See 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.4, at 599–600 (5th ed.
2010) (arguing that State Farm’s reasoned decisionmaking requirement forces agencies to discuss
all major considerations it took into account in formulating a new, major rule to demonstrate that its
rule meets the reasoned decisionmaking requirement).
105. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
106. Id. at 43.
107. PIERCE, supra note 104, § 7.4, at 599.
108. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
109. Id. at 525.
110. Id. at 524; see also Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633 (1990)
(reaffirming this principle in the context of informal agency adjudications).
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procedural requirements on agencies.111 Thus, when reviewing an agencymade rule, courts must confine themselves to the requirements that actually
appear in the agency’s organic statute (and any other relevant statutes) and
not attempt to add any extra-statutory procedures to satisfy their own sense
of what the agency should, or should not, be doing.112
B. “Mirror, Mirror, on the Wall”
In its decisions applying the Review Standard, the precedent most
heavily relied upon by the D.C. Circuit was not that of the Supreme Court
but the D.C. Circuit’s own earlier decisions. Business Roundtable and
American Equity both cite almost exclusively to Chamber of Commerce (at
least with regard to how to interpret the Review Standard), and Chamber of
Commerce in turn relied on the D.C. Circuit’s own decision in Public Citizen
v. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration.113 There, the court reviewed
a regulation that limited the number of hours commercial drivers could
work.114 The court held that the regulation was arbitrary and capricious—but
for reasons we find to be completely inapposite here. There, as here, the
basis of the decision was that the agency had failed to satisfy the
requirements of its organic statute.115 However, the review standard at issue
in Public Citizen is completely unlike the Review Standard applicable to the
SEC; that statute actually requires the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration (FMCSA) to “ensure” that the rule will have the effect of
promoting a specific factor.116 The Public Citizen court vacated the rule at
issue because not only had the agency failed to ensure that the rule would
promote that factor—it hadn’t even discussed it in its adopting release.117
Thus, “[b]ecause the agency . . . wholly failed to comply with this specific
statutory requirement,” the court vacated the agency’s rule.118 The court

111. PIERCE, supra note 104, § 7.8, at 661.
112. See Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 543 (“Absent constitutional constraints or extremely
compelling circumstances the administrative agencies should be free to fashion their own rules of
procedure and to pursue methods of inquiry capable of permitting them to discharge their
multitudinous duties.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
113. 374 F.3d 1209 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
114. Id. at 1214–16.
115. Id. at 1216.
116. See id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 31136(a)(4) (2006)). The agency’s organic statute, the Motor
Carrier Safety Act, stated that “[a]t a minimum, the regulations [promulgated by the agency] shall
ensure that . . . the operation of commercial motor vehicles does not have a deleterious effect on the
physical condition of the operators.” 49 U.S.C. § 31136(a)(4) (2006) (emphasis added).
117. See Pub. Citizen, 374 F.3d at 1217 (requiring the agency to explain its justification for the
new rule and vacating the judgment due to the agency’s failure to consider or discuss the required
statutory factor when it issued its new rule).
118. Id. at 1216.
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needed no further basis on which to invalidate the rule, so it provided no
further holdings on the matter.119
We emphasize that the actual holding of Public Citizen has nothing to
do with cost–benefit analysis—it was that the agency had failed to live up to
the standards in its own statute that it ensure a certain outcome from its
rule.120 But the court did opine—albeit in dicta—on the possible infirmities
of the agency’s cost–benefit analysis. Of particular note is that the statute in
Public Citizen explicitly required the agency to “consider the costs and
benefits” of a proposed rule.121 Thus, the Public Citizen court stood on firm
ground when it opined that the agency had fallen short of its statutory duties.
(The agency there concluded that cost estimates “vary enormously” and thus
refrained from trying to quantify them; it didn’t even bother to give an
excuse for its failure to estimate the rule’s potential benefits.)122 In other
words, the actual holding of Public Citizen had nothing to do with the
agency’s alleged failure to consider costs, much less with its failure to
consider that (or any other) factor.
Yet, despite the difference, Chamber of Commerce used Public Citizen
as the lens through which it assessed the SEC’s satisfaction of the Review
Standard. The court cites Public Citizen fourteen times in its opinion. For
example, Chamber of Commerce invoked Public Citizen for the proposition
that, even if an agency faces uncertainty over the costs of a proposed rule, the
agency has a “statutory obligation to determine as best it can the economic
implications of the rule it has proposed”123 and it must “exercise its expertise
to make tough choices about which of the competing estimates is most
plausible, and to hazard a guess as to which is correct, even if . . . the
estimate will be imprecise.”124 But in doing so the court failed to note that
the review standard at issue in Public Citizen called on the regulatory agency
“[at] a minimum . . . [to] ensure that . . . the operation of commercial motor
vehicles does not have a deleterious effect on the physical condition of the
operators.”125 Moreover, the statute under which the FMCSA had acted
119. See id. (“Several of petitioners’ other objections also raise troubling concerns about the
[agency’s] decisionmaking process. We do not, however, enter final judgment on those, as we are
vacating and remanding the matter in any case . . . .”).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1221 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 31506(d) (2006)). For other examples of Congress
directing those charged with implementing the statute to consider the costs and benefits to any new
regulations or requirements, see also 49 U.S.C. § 31136(c)(2)(A) (2006) and 49 U.S.C. § 31502(d)
(2006).
122. Pub. Citizen, 374 F.3d at 1221–22.
123. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (citing Pub. Citizen,
374 F.3d at 1221).
124. Id. (quoting Pub. Citizen, 374 F.3d at 1221) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
language from Public Citizen, quoted by the Chamber of Commerce court, was itself dicta. The
Public Citizen court declined to “enter [a] final judgment on” the failure to quantify and consider
costs of a proposed rule, but stated it was including the discussion of this point merely “for a sense
of completeness.” Pub. Citizen, 374 F.3d at 1216–17.
125. Pub. Citizen, 374 F.3d at 1212 (emphasis added).
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expressly required that the “Secretary shall consider the costs and benefits of
the requirement.”126 Thus, not only was formal cost–benefit analysis
expressly called for by Congress, but the Secretary was under the further
mandate to “ensure” that the proposed rule did not have a deleterious effect.
Each of these components of the review standard was at the heart of Public
Citizen, but light-years from the Review Standard applicable to the SEC. As
seen, the SEC is not called upon under its Review Standard to either engage
in cost–benefit analysis or to ensure that competition, efficiency, or capital
formation are favorably impacted as a result of the rule. In sum, Chamber of
Commerce rested its analysis and conclusions on the dicta arising from a case
where the regulatory agency was operating under a markedly different
review standard. One can speculate, therefore, whether the mixing of apples
and oranges yields only a lemon.
Business Roundtable made limited reference to Public Citizen;
nonetheless, it relied almost exclusively on Chamber of Commerce,
particularly those passages of Chamber of Commerce that rested on Public
Citizen. While courts can be expected to rely on their own precedents, such
reliance is mischievous when the precedents are inapposite, as was Public
Citizen to the issues before the court in Chamber of Commerce and Business
Roundtable.
C.

Defying the Supreme Court—Usurping Congress

A close analysis of the D.C. Circuit’s decisions in Chamber of
Commerce and Business Roundtable reflects stunning disconnects. As seen
in Part II, while the D.C. Circuit’s opinions repeatedly call for cost–benefit
analysis, this is not the standard that Congress prescribed. Indeed, neither
case involved, as did American Equity, the question of what role efficiency,
competition, and capital formation should play in the review process. Most
significantly, the D.C. Circuit engages in the ultimate disconnect—namely,
being outside the precedent, reviewed above, developed by the Supreme
Court for judicial review of actions by administrative agencies. Through its
single-minded focus on cost–benefit analysis, the ultimate effect of the
Chamber of Commerce and Business Roundtable decisions appears to be
nothing less than establishing a new review standard. If this surmise is
correct—and we believe it can hardly be otherwise—then each of these
decisions violates the simple, clear holding of the Supreme Court that the
“circumstances which would ever justify a court in overturning agency action
because of a failure to employ procedures beyond those required by the

126. 49 U.S.C. § 31502(d) (2006) (emphasis added); see also id. § 31136(c)(2) (“Before
prescribing regulations under this section, the Secretary shall consider, to the extent practicable[,]
. . . costs and benefits . . . .”).
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statute[,] . . . if they exist, are extremely rare.”127 As a leading commentator
has observed, this principle, first established in Vermont Yankee, has had a
dramatic effect on judicial review of agency rulemaking, stopping courts
from imposing extra-statutory procedural requirements on agencies.128
The incongruity of Chamber of Commerce and Business Roundtable
with Vermont Yankee is even sharper when considered against American
Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. Donovan,129 where the Supreme Court
observed that “Congress uses specific language when intending that an
agency engage in cost–benefit analysis.”130 The Supreme Court then cited to
numerous statutory examples where Congress had so expressed its intentions
in clear and unambiguous language, using the phrase itself or mentioning
“costs” in relation to some other stated objective, or simply using terms like
“feasible.”131 Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that the absence of such
clear verbiage means that the reviewing court cannot compel the agency to
engage in cost–benefit analysis.132
American Equity133 stands on quite different footing than either
Chamber of Commerce or Business Roundtable. In American Equity, Chief
Judge Sentelle—who also authored Public Citizen—confined the court’s
analysis to a review of the section of the adopting release that actually dealt
with “efficiency, competition, and capital formation.”134 Rather than
focusing on costs and benefits, he emphasized the overall incompleteness of
the rule’s supporting analysis.135 In this way, the analysis in American
Equity differed greatly from that in Chamber of Commerce and Business
Roundtable.

127. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978); see also Pension
Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 644–46 (1990) (reaffirming this principle in the
context of informal agency adjudications).
128. PIERCE, supra note 104, § 7.8, at 661.
129. 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
130. Id. at 510–11. American Textile is a natural extension of Vermont Yankee, since if the
reviewing court cannot impose a standard other than that adopted by Congress, the reviewing court
cannot impose cost–benefit analysis where Congress has stated another review standard.
131. Id. at 510–12, 510 n.30. One such example the Court referenced was where the statute
requires the agency to use “the best available and safest technologies . . . , except where the
Secretary determines that the incremental benefits are clearly insufficient to justify the incremental
costs.” Id. at 510 (emphasis omitted).
132. Id. at 512; see Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1498, 1508 (2009) (stating
that in American Textile the agency did not need to “engage in cost–benefit analysis,” in part
because the statute did not contain such a requirement).
133. American Equity was originally decided in 2009. See Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v.
SEC, 572 F.3d 923, 936 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (remanding and requiring the SEC to “either complete an
analysis sufficient to satisfy its obligations under § 2(b) [of the Securities Act], or explain why that
section does not govern this rulemaking”), amended and superseded, 613 F.3d 166, 179 (D.C. Cir.
2010). The opinion was reissued with amendments in 2010 to reflect the Court’s decision that
vacating the SEC rule was the appropriate remedy. Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d
166 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
134. Am. Equity, 613 F.3d at 176–79.
135. Id. at 177–79.
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And arguably, the court did a better job of adhering to the hard-look
standards from State Farm and (more generally) the APA by focusing on the
quality of the reasoning that the SEC actually did when it promulgated
Rule 151A. In State Farm the Court held that an agency must provide a
“satisfactory explanation for its action.”136 And in American Equity, the
court focused on each of the SEC’s serial conclusions that Rule 151A would
in fact favorably impact “efficiency,” “competition,” and “capital
formation.”137 Because the SEC’s analysis in support of those conclusions
fell so woefully short of being convincing, the D.C. Circuit held that the
SEC’s adoption of the rule was arbitrary and capricious. Simply stated, the
SEC failed to provide a reasoned explanation for the rule it adopted, at least
against readily available alternatives. (Indeed, even if the SEC had not gone
so far as to conclude that Rule 151A would favorably impact efficiency,
competition, and capital formation, the incompleteness in the SEC’s
reasoning seems to us to be so great that the result would not have changed.)
We therefore believe the American Equity panel stood on firm ground,
ground sowed by State Farm, because the court there assessed the quality of
the reasoning the SEC employed in its efficiency, competition, and capital
formation analysis.
D.

Has the SEC Repeatedly Shot Itself in the Foot?

We might still question whether the American Equity court nonetheless
overstepped the limits of judicial review by failing to judge the SEC’s
performance per the terms of the Review Standard: after all, the court
focused on whether the SEC had properly concluded that Rule 151A would
actually promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation, rather than
just asking whether the SEC has adequately considered the question. As
seen, the Review Standard asks only that the SEC consider whether the
proposed rule will promote those factors. It doesn’t require the SEC to
ensure or otherwise conclude that the factors will be promoted. Nor does it
require the SEC to ensure (or even conclude) that the proposed rule will have
the net effect of promoting those factors (rather than having the effect of
promoting those factors in some way, but the net effect being one of not
promoting them). Nor does it specify the universe of data that it must
consider—and this point differentiates the Review Standard from, say, other
laws (like the one at issue in State Farm) that specifically require the agency

136. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
137. See Am. Equity, 613 F.3d at 177 (discussing how the SEC’s § 2(b) analysis regarding
“competition” failed because the Commission “d[id] not disclose a reasoned basis for its conclusion
that Rule 151A would increase competition” (emphasis added)); id. at 179 (“The SEC’s failure to
analyze the efficiency of the existing state law regime renders arbitrary and capricious the SEC’s
judgment that applying federal securities law would increase efficiency.” (emphasis added)).
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to consider a particular set of data or research, and to take those into
consideration when promulgating a rule.138
In American Equity, the court simply circumnavigated these issues by
focusing on what the SEC actually purported to do; the SEC’s adopting
release reached conclusions regarding the favorable effects Rule 151A would
have on efficiency, competition, and capital formation.139 We might well
wonder what the result would have been had the SEC instead merely
explored the possible effects, pro and con, on each of the review factors. But
the SEC instead affirmatively found that Rule 151A would enhance
efficiency, competition, and capital formation. By doing this, it fell into
State Farm’s talons. In State Farm, the agency was under no express
statutory obligation to weigh the rule’s potential costs and benefits.140 Yet,
the agency did so anyway.141 The Supreme Court proceeded to assess the
agency’s actions on the agency’s own terms. Having found the cost–benefit
analysis incomplete, the Court concluded the agency had acted arbitrarily and
capriciously in adopting the rule since it failed to provide a “reasoned
analysis” for its action.142
Similar to State Farm, the D.C. Circuit’s decisions in Chamber of
Commerce and Business Roundtable can be seen as instances where the
agency justifies its rule by an approach not directly implicated by the Review
Standard, namely reviewing the costs and benefits of the rule it adopts. For
example, in the rulemaking reviewed in Chamber of Commerce the SEC
provided close analysis of the impact of the proposed changes in governance
rules on efficiency, competition, and capital formation in Part VIII of the
adopting release, and in Part VI of the release, it estimated the costs and
benefits of the new rule.143 Most striking is that the SEC in adopting the new
independence rules focused its attention on the reasoning advanced in the
138. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 33, 43 (articulating the requirement under the National Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 that the Secretary of Transportation “consider ‘relevant
available motor vehicle safety data’” and “articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action
including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made’” (citations omitted)).
139. Am. Equity, 613 F.3d at 176–79; Indexed Annuities and Certain Other Insurance
Contracts, Securities Act Release No. 8996, Exchange Act Release No. 59,221, 74 Fed. Reg. 3138,
3169–72 (Jan. 16, 2009) (codified in part at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
140. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 33–34 (articulating the statutory requirement that the NHTSA
“consider . . . whether the proposed standard ‘is reasonable, practicable and appropriate’” and “the
‘extent to which such standards will contribute to carrying out the purposes’ of the [National Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966]”). In assessing the cost–benefit analysis engaged in by the
NHTSA, the court remarked that “[t]he agency’s obligation is to articulate a ‘rational connection
between the facts found and the choice made.’” Id. at 59.
141. Id. at 54–55.
142. Id. at 57.
143. Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,520, 69 Fed.
Reg. 46,378, 46,386–87, 46,388–89 (Aug. 2, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270); see Chamber of
Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (finding that even if there is uncertainty as
to the effects of a proposed rule on efficiency, competition, capital formation, or costs this does not
excuse the SEC from its statutory obligation to consider the economic consequences of a proposed
regulation).
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latter and not the former. While this might appear totally consistent with
State Farm, we believe there is an important, albeit nuanced, difference.
Chamber of Commerce does not, as did State Farm, merely hold the agency
failed to provide a reasoned basis through the use of cost–benefit analysis—
but expressly held that the cost–benefit approach underlaid the Review
Standard.144 Had Chamber of Commerce instead more narrowly limited its
holding, the court’s approach would have been closer to the firm ground of
State Farm. However, the message remains: had the SEC eschewed
proffering a conclusion premised on cost–benefit analysis, it would have
(under available Supreme Court precedent) been in a much better place for
limiting the scope of judicial review.
There is yet another force lurking in the background. Cost–benefit
analysis of agency actions is regularly undertaken by the Office of
Management and Budget through its Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA).145 However, independent regulatory agencies, such as the
SEC, have not been subject to OIRA reviews, reflecting the constitutional
uncertainty surrounding whether the executive branch can interdict activities
carried out by an agency pursuant to congressionally enacted standards and
mandates.146
It is intriguing to speculate whether the SEC’s rules would meet with
more success if subject to OIRA review rather than the newly established
activism of the D.C. Circuit.147 Equally ponderous is whether the D.C.

144. See Chamber of Commerce, 412 F.3d at 144 (holding that the SEC violated the APA when
it failed to consider the costs of two conditions in its proposed regulations).
145. The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) is the product of the Paper
Reduction Act of 1980.
About OIRA, WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE MGMT. & BUDGET,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg_administrator. President Reagan soon mobilized the
office to undertake cost–benefit analysis of non-independent regulatory agencies through Executive
Order 12,291. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981); see Thomas O. McGarity, Presidential
Control of Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 443, 478 & n.171 (1987)
(discussing presidential efforts to increase agency accountability through the use of executive
orders).
146. See Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving Federal
Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost–Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1489, 1506 (2002)
(stating that President Reagan considered, but declined, subjecting independent agencies to these
reviews).
147. OIRA and review by a federal appellate court, however, are not mirror images of one
another. While the appellate court can be expected to have a point of view, it is less likely to be
swayed by external influence than OIRA. Indeed, there is a good deal of information surrounding
the conduct and outcomes of OIRA review that calls into question the detachment with which costs
and benefits were assessed. There is every reason to fear that the independence of the review
process within the executive branch of government is not likely to be as insulated from external
influence as occurs in the more transparent adversarial setting of judicial review. See Nicholas
Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
1260, 1305–07 (2006) (applying public choice theory and arguing that the OIRA would be
vulnerable to lobbying by interest groups). Moreover, OIRA reviews are not themselves subject to
judicial review. Id. at 1309. For criticism of the OIRA process, see generally Alan B. Morrison,
OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 1059 (1986).
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Circuit would be less demanding in its own review of SEC rulemaking if
aware that each SEC action could be, and might have been, reviewed by
OIRA. In any case, rigorous review of SEC rules by the D.C. Circuit might
be seen as placing SEC rulemaking on the same footing as non-independent
regulatory agency rulemaking. In this sense, the recent arousal of the D.C.
Circuit moves the SEC toward a level of accountability applied to many
other agencies of the federal government. But, the D.C. Circuit’s activism
also poses a serious separation of powers issue to the extent it imposes a
standard for review contrary to the one adopted by Congress. Nonetheless,
the SEC’s repeated efforts in setting forth costs and benefits as a separate
portion of its analysis to support adoption of rules can be seen as being in
step with OIRA reviews and, hence, defensive to any movement to subject
the agency to OIRA.
IV. Moving Forward in the Reshaped Regulatory Landscape
Nearly half a century ago, Richard Stewart crisply summarized the
dilemma posed by judicial review of agency rulemaking to determine
whether adequate consideration was given to multiple objectives Congress
has set forth for the agency to consider:
[I]t is unlikely that principles or guidelines can be developed for
weighing particular interests, [so that] agencies attempting to solve
complex problems will be largely unable to anticipate what a
subsequent reviewing court may demand of them. Even on remand,
there is no assurance that the agency’s best efforts to redistribute
weights among the various interests will satisfy the reviewing court.
The resulting oscillation between agency and court may entail
enormous delays and impose substantial costs on the litigants, the
agency, and the society generally. Since agencies and public interest
representatives command only limited resources, such costs may
seriously impair the effort to stimulate more effective agency action
on behalf of unorganized interests. On the other hand, if courts sought
to avoid such costs by declining to remand agency decisions for
further proceedings, they would be abandoning the only effective
sanction behind the adequate consideration requirement.148
There can be little doubt that the D.C. Circuit has overstepped the
permissible level of review Congress intended for SEC rulemaking. The
complaint is not, however, novel. Administrative law scholars, judges, and
regulators have long written on the appropriate balance to be struck when
judges are reviewing agency actions.149 In broad overview, the question is

148. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1667, 1784 (1975) (footnotes omitted).
149. See, e.g., Frank E. Cooper, Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions, 3 U. DET. L.J. 53,
54–55 (1940) (introducing the article’s topic of balancing administrative authority and judicial
review of administrative decisions); Cuthbert W. Pound, Constitutional Aspects of American
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not just that of relative competencies, pitting the technocratic staff of the
agency against the generalist courts, but also involves issues of mediating
interest politics that can impact the course of regulation. On this point, the
ideal of an independent judiciary can be trumpeted as necessary to address
the narrower group self-interest that might underlay a regulatory initiative.
Confounding these historical tensions in the case of the SEC are the
multiple factors set forth in the Review Standard. As seen earlier, when
Congress inserted the additional considerations of “efficiency, competition
and capital formation,” the Committee Report was clear in saying that these
considerations were not to override the long-established criteria of investor
protection.150 And, Congress assigned no weight to be given to any of the
newly added factors. Moreover, assessing the probable impact of any rule is
always problematic, and more so to assess the imponderable benefits and
burdens of a rule on efficiency, competition, and capital formation.
One approach to this conundrum would be for the reviewing court to
accord the regulatory agency deference on such indefinite, speculative, and
arcane considerations, since judicial review on such a matter is beyond the
court’s core competency. This was the quiet life the SEC led prior to
Chamber of Commerce.151 Another approach, reflected in the D.C. Circuit’s
interpretation, is to read into Congress’s Review Standard the D.C. Circuit’s
own limitation.152 When this course has been taken, it has seriously eroded
the discretion of the administrative agency.153 Because so much of what the
SEC deals with is rulemaking that, on the one hand, produces benefits to
investors, markets, market participants, and the economy as a whole that are
speculative and non-quantifiable—and, on the other hand, entails costs that
are easily quantifiable—it has invited a judicially contrived mandate for the
SEC to rigorously set forth the case that the perceived benefits exceed the
estimated costs. If that is what is required, then the D.C. Circuit has
eviscerated the agency, at least in areas where challenges to its rules would
be expected. But is this the course that the D.C. Circuit has begun, or is there
room within its own approach to recalibrate and reach a result more
consistent with Congress’s intent and the role of an independent regulatory
agency such as the SEC?

Administrative Law, 9 A.B.A. J. 409, 413 (1923) (questioning the extent to which administrative
decisions should be exempt from judicial review); Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review in
Midpassage: The Uneasy Partnership Between Courts and Agencies Plays On, 32 TULSA L.J. 221,
221 (1996) (providing a D.C. Circuit judge’s opinion on how current doctrines of judicial review
work in practice).
150. See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
152. See Martin Shapiro, Administrative Discretion: The Next Stage, 92 YALE L.J. 1487, 1508
(1983) (suggesting courts can deal with uncertainty by reading statutes as placing the burden of
proof on agencies, and resolving unclear situations in favor of industry).
153. See, e.g., id. (describing a case where the court read into a statute a requirement that the
agency establish significant risk for low-level benzene exposure before setting a maximum exposure
level as stripping the agency of its discretion).
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In a contemporary legal and political climate that is defined by a rising
skepticism of government and more particularly of regulation,154 the SEC
(and for that matter all independent regulatory agencies) must accept that it
cannot support its rulemaking only through generalized, undeveloped
assertions of a proposed rule’s impact on competition, efficiency, and capital
formation. Such a bald assertion is not likely to survive attack in the U.S.
Supreme Court. More is always better than less, and even more so when it
comes to justifying burdensome regulations in today’s legal and political
climate.155 Furthermore, the legislative history of the NSMIA, reviewed
earlier, reflects that Congress unquestionably did expect thoughtful
consideration of competition, efficiency, and capital formation whenever the
SEC engages in rulemaking.156 Drive-by justifications that are dismissive of
the burdens of the regulation, while once the norm for SEC rulemaking, are
no longer acceptable. Hence, our analysis of the legislative history supports
the result reached by the D.C. Circuit in American Equity, but not in
Chamber of Commerce or Business Roundtable.
What remains in doubt is the degree of deference to be accorded the
SEC. Here we should distinguish the issues posed in Chamber of Commerce
and American Equity from those in Business Roundtable. In Chamber of
Commerce and American Equity, the SEC launched new regulatory
approaches—requiring, respectively, greater board independence and
classifying a financial product as a security157—without developing a
sufficiently detailed record for either regulatory initiative. The justifications
set forth were not supported empirically, but rhetorically. The agency
appears to have been content to draw largely on its asserted expertise that
these initiatives would improve investor protection and the proposed rule
would favorably impact efficiency, competition, and capital formation.

154. See Larry Margasak, House Republicans Stepping Up Anti-Regulation Effort,
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 2, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/12/02/house-gop-antiregulation-bills_n_1125242.html (describing anti-regulation bills proposed by House Republicans
in December 2011); Frank Newport, Americans Leery of Too Much Gov’t Regulation of Business,
GALLUP (Feb. 2, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/125468/Americans-Leery-Govt-RegulationBusiness.aspx (finding 57% of Americans are worried about too much regulation of business);
Lydia Saad, At 13%, Congress’ Approval Ties All-Time Low, GALLUP (Oct. 12, 2011),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/150038/Congress-Approval-Ties-Time-Low.aspx (finding low approval
of Congress across political affiliation).
155. A reflection of the anti-regulatory bias toward securities regulatory issues is Congress’
recently enacted Jumpstarting Our Business Startups Act, which includes, among numerous
provisions removing regulation for so-called “emerging growth companies” and other startups, a
call on the SEC to review the disclosure regulations for registering securities so as to “modernize
and simplify the registration process and reduce the costs and other burdens” associated with
regulation. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 108, 126 Stat. 306,
313 (2012). This is the only reference, however, in the legislation to any assessments of regulatory
costs and burdens.
156. See supra notes 74–77 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text.
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Unlike the initiatives in Chamber of Commerce and American Equity,
the initiative challenged in Business Roundtable—proxy access—was a
response to legislation that clearly provided that the SEC’s rules “may
include a requirement” giving shareholders the means to nominate
directors.158 By enacting that authority on that precise issue, not under some
broadly written enabling statute, Congress took the big policy issue, proxy
access, off the table. So viewed, it is anomalous that the entire analysis in
Business Roundtable is devoted to the SEC’s failings in justifying any
shareholder access to the nominating process.
For example, the D.C. Circuit chastised the SEC’s failure to set forth the
costs corporations may incur in opposing nominees, the SEC’s failure to
address the probable benefits shareholder access might have on company
performance, and the SEC’s failure to consider whether special interest
groups, most notably labor unions, would use proxy access as leverage to
advance interests unrelated to increasing shareholder value.159 These are
each legitimate concerns. But they are concerns that go to the core issue—
shareholder authority to nominate directors.
Nowhere in Business
Roundtable does the D.C. Circuit take note that it was Congress that
addressed and answered the question of the appropriateness of shareholder
access as a means for the SEC to advance its mandate.
Stunningly, Business Roundtable makes no reference whatsoever to the
Dodd-Frank Act’s express authorization for a rule providing proxy access or
note that the SEC acted pursuant to that authority.160 The grant of authority
to the SEC was not only unqualified, but clearly anticipated that the SEC
would adopt a rule that provided terms and conditions for what the agency
believed was appropriate proxy access.161 Congress expressly authorized the
SEC to provide a mechanism for shareholder access and thereby embraced
the benefits of shareholder access. The legislative history is clear that proxy
access was to be provided and that Congress was deferring to the SEC to
address the conditions under which such access would be available.162 The

158. See supra notes 2, 6–10 and accompanying text.
159. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1150–52 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
160. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 971, 124 Stat. 1376, 1915 (2010).
161. See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 146–47 (2010) (discussing proxy access and the Section’s
grant of great discretion to the SEC in delineating such access). While stating that § 972 of the
Dodd-Frank Act did not require the SEC to engage in rulemaking, it recognized that the provision
gives the SEC wide latitude in terms of proxy access. Id. at 146. The report explains that “[t]he
Committee feels that it is proper for shareholders, as the owners of the corporation, to have the right
to nominate candidates for the Board using the issuer’s proxy under limited circumstances.” Id. It
then proceeds to quote from the testimony of several hearing witnesses enthusiastically supporting
proxy access. Id. at 146–47.
162. See id. at 146 (“The authority gives the SEC wide latitude in setting the terms of such
proxy access. . . . If the SEC proposes rules, interested persons can offer their views on the
appropriateness of proposed regulatory terms in the public comment process. The Committee feels
that it is proper for shareholders, as the owners of the corporation, to have the right to nominate
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fault of Business Roundtable was failing to note this distinction from statutes
at issue in its prior holdings, where Congress had not spoken directly to the
topic of greater independence (except for the forty percent it had already
required in the Investment Company Act163) or whether indexed annuities
should be deemed securities.
The D.C. Circuit’s analysis, by focusing exclusively on the broad policy
question that Congress had taken off the table, is misdirected. By enacting
Dodd-Frank, Congress embraced the broader concept of shareholder access,
leaving it to the SEC to identify how that vision is to be achieved. So
viewed, the D.C. Circuit’s review most appropriately should have been
confined to the details of the proposal, such as the three-percent- and threeyear-ownership requirements. As a consequence, the D.C. Circuit has not
only flaunted the Review Standard, but has also essentially invalidated the
will of Congress.
The issue raised in Business Roundtable turned on much finer (indeed,
technical) points for which we might expect there would be a much stronger
case for deference to the SEC since Congress had taken the larger policy
question off the table. But, no doubt blinded by its own precedents, the D.C.
Circuit failed to note the distinction and failed to focus on the real question
posed by Rule 14a-11: whether that rule was within the authority delegated
by Congress to the SEC. The question then would have been the more
indefinite inquiry regarding why three years, three percent, and only a
distinct minority of the board were the applicable metrics for carrying out
Congress’s will under the Review Standard. The following discussion
suggests how questions such as these are to be considered under the Review
Standard.
As seen, there are four factors the Commission is to consider in its
rulemaking: investor protection, efficiency, competition, and capital
formation. The operative verb in the Review Standard is “consider,” so that
there is no necessity that the Commission find or ensure or conclude that the
proposed rule satisfies each of these factors.164 As seen in our discussion of
the legislative history, the rejection of the Senate’s version of the Review
Standard, and the later enactment of a different standard for the CFTC while
simultaneously appending the Standard to the Investment Advisers Act,
support the view that Congress chose “consider” advisedly.165 “Consider,”
rather than “find” or “conclude,” is inherently necessary for regulation
pursuant to a multifactor approach like the one embraced in the Review
Standard since in the complex area of financial regulation, any regulatory
action is likely to fail under one or more of the factors.

candidates for the Board using the issuer’s proxy under limited circumstances.”); supra notes 62–64
and accompanying text.
163. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 10(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a–10(a) (2006).
164. See supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 64–71 and accompanying text.
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The tension surrounding proxy access is an example of the problematic
features of the Review Standard’s embrace of these four factors. Most
certainly shareholder access raises costs for a corporation which, having
taken the first step to nominate through its board a management slate that it
believes would best serve the corporate interest, must, when confronted with
competition, take up the corporation’s nominees’ cause. That is, when
confronted with an opposition slate through the proxy access provision, the
corporation’s management will not abandon its nominees, but will increase
its efforts to ensure that the board-nominated nominees are elected. This
necessarily means that a contest between the two slates will result; hence,
there will be additional costs to the corporation. And, if the insurgents are
elected, the corporation may well find their costs will be borne by the
corporation, i.e., costs on costs.166 There is modest evidence regarding the
amount of these costs when only a minority of the board seats is at stake,
which was the most that was permitted by Rule 14a-11.167 Note here that the
benefits of the proxy access rule, to be sure, are difficult to quantify, but the
costs will be evident in the incremental campaign expenditures made by the
corporation. Thus, on the efficiency factor, the status quo likely gets the nod;
the board controls the nominating process, thus reducing costs and
uncertainty of outcome.168
Another way of stating this is that democracy in any form is more costly
than a less-democratic means of operation, such as the self-perpetuating
board. Competition for board seats likely produces benefits: a fuller
discussion of the candidates’ relative strength and their vetting, on average,
might be expected to produce better qualified directors. That is, proxy access
is about competition for board seats, so why would efficiency not be an easy
factor to satisfy for this initiative? It is not easy to satisfy if the Review
Standard’s referent is not competition for board seats, but making the
industry in which the issuer operates more competitive. This illustrates the

166. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 113 (2011) (authorizing bylaws providing reimbursement of
proxy contest expenses incurred in connection with the election of directors).
167. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 9136,
Exchange Act Release No. 62,764, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,384, 75 Fed. Reg.
56,668, 56,675 (Sept. 16, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, and 249) (stating that
Rule 14a-11 cannot be used by a shareholder seeking to change control of the company). Rule 14a11 was struck down by the D.C. Circuit shortly after it was enacted. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647
F.3d 1144, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (discussing the costs of Rule 14a-11 and holding that the SEC
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in not assessing the “economic effects of [this] new rule”).
168. Broadly speaking, it is on this point that commentators appear united in their
condemnation of proxy access, believing that broader interests and long-term objectives pursued by
the board will be compromised by interests groups seeking short-term and narrower objectives. See,
e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158
U. PA. L. REV. 653, 690 (2010) (“[S]hareholder empowerment will make it much more difficult for
a good board of directors to resist pressures to manage to the market.”); Lisa Fairfax, Delaware’s
New Proxy Access: Much Ado About Nothing?, 11 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 87, 92 (2009)
(“[G]ranting all shareholders access to the proxy statement could increase the influence of
shareholders with narrow or special interests . . . .”).
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amorphous quality, indeed open-endedness, of not just this factor but the
entire spectrum of factors in the Review Standard.
Moving to the final factor, we might therefore easily conclude that
proxy access is at best neutral on capital formation—gains in lowering the
cost of capital associated with improved governance might easily be offset,
on average, by the additional costs associated with proxy access. Here the
certainty of costs is likely to be more compelling than the nonmeasurable
benefit. Since proxy access can result in nominees chosen outside the
otherwise watchful eye of the CEO, such access can be understood—as it is
indeed championed by its proponents—to protect investors. But it is a
protection that has costs, which are negatives in the efficiency and
competition realms. Thus, an assessment under the Review Standard on
proxy access—or for that matter most any other regulatory initiative—is
unlikely to always be supportable under each of the four considerations.
When it fails under some of the criteria and squeaks by on others,
should this cause the agency to withdraw from the initiative? As seen earlier,
the only clear statement on this by Congress when it enacted the Review
Standard in the NSMIA was that the historical concern of shareholder
protection remained inviolable.169 This seems sensible; a rule that does not
advance investor interests but is otherwise efficient, competitive, and
promotes the aggregation of capital would be hard for the SEC to embrace.
But more importantly, by choosing the verb “consider,” Congress clearly
called on the SEC to mediate across the four factors. What is required, as
seen earlier, is a thoughtful exploration of how the four factors are likely to
interact if the initiative is adopted. We believe the SEC may better be able to
satisfy the “hard look” review, even one closely scrutinizing its assessment
of costs and benefits, through pursuing three straightforward strategies: stop
concluding, stage any sweeping initiative, and scale regulation.
A. “Consider,” Not Conclude—Analytical, Not Econometrical
Dirty Harry reminds us “[a] man’s got to know his limitations.”170 This
may well be a lesson more easily learned by the SEC than the D.C. Circuit;
in any case, as the initiating party, the SEC should try to control the terrain
on which the jousting will occur. Thus, we counsel that the SEC step back
from practices followed in the past, reorient its approach, and seek to prevail
by shifting the lens it presents for reviewing its initiatives.
An important step forward in addressing the new review standard
adopted by the D.C. Circuit is to reorient the reasoning supporting the
proposed regulatory initiative. As developed above, the legislative intent
surrounding the Review Standard does not require that the SEC either find,
conclude, or otherwise decide that a proposed regulation improves efficiency,

169. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
170. MAGNUM FORCE (Warner Bros. Pictures 1973).

1840

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 90:1811

competition, or capital formation.171 At the same time, the D.C. Circuit has
not rebuffed SEC regulatory efforts for failing to fully take each of these
items into consideration in a detailed manner. By appearing to conclude, as
the SEC has, that each of these standards has been met, the SEC sets the
stage for the reviewing court to test that conclusion against the record. As
developed above and in the next two sections, determining the costs and
benefits for any regulatory initiative is problematic; incompleteness of the
analysis can easily be found, and has been found. This seems to be the most
fundamental conclusion that can be drawn from Chamber of Commerce,
American Equity, and Business Roundtable.
But our suggestion is more sweeping than avoiding any “conclusions.”
We counsel that the SEC in proposing its rules should do so as a lawyer, not
as an econometrician or empiricist. There is a decided tone in the D.C.
Circuit decisions that that court believes it is they, and not the SEC, who are
the econometricians. This might be the case, although it is hard to know why
that could be. Nonetheless, the SEC appears to have blindly walked into the
trap it has set for itself by repeatedly framing justifications for the rule on
costs and benefits. In a sense, it now finds itself hoisted by its own petard.
Indeed, recent signs from the agency point to an even greater role for cost–
benefit analysis, and economists generally, in the SEC’s future rulemaking
attempts.172
Decidedly lacking in the supporting releases that accompanied each of
the initiatives successfully challenged in the trilogy of cases reviewed in this
Article were tightly reasoned arguments and judgments respecting how the
rule actually performed under each of the factors of the Review Standard. A
case in point is the governance rules adopted under the Investment Company
Act that were struck down in Chamber of Commerce. The econometrics for
assessing governance requirements on firm performance and value are
extraordinarily problematic. For example, is governance value created in all
operating conditions, when the firm is in crisis, or never?
Rather than wringing its hands over such questions, as the SEC did in its
adopting release, we believe it might have been wiser to have built a
qualitative case for the rule (rather than attempting the impossible by trying
to build a quantitative case): First, explain that the world of mutual funds is

171. See supra notes 74–98 and accompanying text.
172. In a recently circulated internal memo, the SEC appears to have instructed its staff to
provide even greater economic analysis of its proposed rules by involving economists early and
often in the rulemaking process and requiring economists’ approval before adopting a final rule.
Sarah N. Lynch, SEC Looks to Economists for Legal Cover, REUTERS (Apr. 16, 2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/16/us-sec-economic-analysis-idUSBRE83F16W20120416.
See generally The SEC’s Aversion to Cost–Benefit Analysis: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
TARP, Fin. Servs. & Bailouts of Pub. & Private Programs of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t
Reform, 112th Cong. (2012) [hereinafter SEC’s Aversion to Cost–Benefit Analysis] (statement of
Mary Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n) (discussing in general terms a recently
circulated internal “guidance” on SEC rulemaking).
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inherently incestuous (where the outside advisor essentially handpicks the
parties to negotiate the self-dealing arrangements for which the SEC was
proposing more independence), then, explain in a purely analytical manner
how the increased independence mandated by the rule would strengthen the
fund–advisor negotiations that are otherwise infected with conflicts of
interest. The point is that not all rules readily lend themselves to rigorous
cost–benefit analysis. Far better in most cases to make the analytical case
that identifies the problem and carefully explain how the highly textured rule
addresses the problems posed.173
In this context, the rule’s probable impact on efficiency, competition,
and capital formation could be addressed analytically and not
econometrically. Instead, the most detailed analysis in the rules challenged
in Chamber of Commerce and Business Roundtable was that of the costs and
benefits associated with the rule. Insufficient attention was given to the host
of variables that could impact a rule’s possible effects under each of these
factors. Thus, we counsel that the SEC would better expend its efforts by
clearly stating just what the objective sought by a given rule is, why the rule
as written accomplishes that objective, the relative strengths and weaknesses
of other approaches considered or suggested by the comments, what the
possible impact on each of the Review Standard’s factors might be, and what
variables are unknown (and unknowable a priori) in making those estimates.
If the SEC thoroughly set forth its reasons bearing on how a regulatory
initiative, based on available information, would likely impact efficiency,
competition, and capital formation, it would not be framing the issue as
whether, for example, efficiency results from the rule, but rather whether the
SEC has developed a record supporting its close consideration of a range of
potential inputs bearing on the rule’s impact on efficiency. After taking a
similar approach for each of the four factors of the Review Standard, it could
then justify why it is that the rule, as adopted, is an advisable course. This
approach also allows for the agency, implicitly, to assign distinctly different
weights to each of the Review Standard’s factors, mindful that the sine qua
non of any rulemaking, as stated in the NSMIA amendment to the Review
Standard, is investor protection.
Costs and benefits will be part of this analysis, but conclusions as to
each should be avoided. And, when the SEC does undertake analysis, albeit
without “concluding,” of costs and benefits it believes flow from a proposed
rule, the SEC should carefully and precisely identify discrete aspects of the

173. The SEC appears to be taking small steps towards the approach we recommend: Chairman
Schapiro recently testified to Congress that in the future, when a proposed rule’s costs and benefits
cannot reasonably be quantified, the adopting release should provide: (1) some explanation of why
that is the case, and (2) a “qualitative analysis of the likely economic consequences of the proposed
rule.” SEC’s Aversion to Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 172, at 16 (statement of Mary Schapiro,
Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n).
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rule it included to minimize potential costs and, likewise, should identify
provisions of the rule likely to maximize the benefits of the rule.
B.

Staging Regulation

For decades, the exclusive domain for trading in stocks listed on the
New York Stock Exchange was the NYSE.174 This was not because of any
natural forces; it was because NYSE’s Rule 390 prohibited off-board
trading.175 This monopoly, comfortable for the NYSE and its members but
less comfortable for others, began to weaken when the SEC, in June 1980,
adopted Rule 19c-3, permitting securities listed after April 26, 1979, to be
traded elsewhere.176 In this way, the SEC created natural conditions for
observing the pricing and general market effects for securities that were

174. See Tai-Kong Kam et al., Competition Among Markets: The Repeal of Rule 390, 27 J.
BANKING & FIN. 1711, 1712 (2003) (stating that Rule 390’s prohibition on trading stocks off of the
exchange dated back to the 18th century).
175. Id.
176. The table for challenging the New York Stock Exchange’s off-board trading restrictions
was set by amendments to the 1975 Securities Act that, among other features, directed the SEC to
“facilitate the establishment of a national market system.” Securities Act Amendments of 1975,
Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 7, 89 Stat. 97, 112 (1975) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1 (2006)).
Congress also required the SEC “to review any and all rules of national securities exchanges which
limit or condition the ability of members to effect transactions in securities otherwise than on such
exchanges” and report its finding to Congress as well as commence proceedings “to amend any
such rule imposing a burden on competition which does not appear to the Commission to be
necessary or appropriate.” Id. at § 7(c)(4)(A). The industry resisted the notion that competition was
desirable or would be enhanced by relaxing the off-board trading rule. See Wall Street Firms
Defend Rules Favoring Members of Exchange, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1975, at 67 (describing a
letter by twenty-two Wall Street firms expressing their uniform opinion that the benefits of relaxing
the off-board rule would be dwarfed by the resulting costs). While the SEC did propose Rule 19c-2,
which would have repealed the restriction outright, Announcement of Proceeding Regarding
Exchange Off-Board Trading Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 13,662, 12 SEC DIGEST 947
(proposed June 23, 1977), it ultimately withdrew that proposal and adopted Rule 19c-3, which
tested the impact of removing the off-board trading restrictions by holding that securities listed after
April 26, 1979 would not be subject to that restriction. Off-Board Trading Restrictions, Exchange
Act Release No. 16,888, 45 Fed. Reg. 41,125, 41,127 (June 18, 1980) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240)
(“The Commission . . . believes that the Rule is justified by its experimental value which will
further the purposes of the Act by providing actual experience with the effects of concurrent overthe-counter and exchange trading.”).
Further experimentation occurred, albeit as a result of pressure from Congress, when the SEC
initiated for thirty companies, during a test period of six months, a linkage among seven stock
exchanges and the OTC market to see if their trading would move away from their prime-listed
market. Electronic Link of 7 Exchanges; OTC Will Begin, WALL ST. J., May 7, 1982, at 5.
The NYSE repealed Rule 390 in December 1999 and the SEC approved its actions in 2000.
NYSE Rulemaking: Order Approving Proposal to Rescind Exchange Rule 390, Exchange Act
Release No. 42,758, 65 Fed. Reg. 30,175, 30,176 (May 10, 2000). The repeal had the broad support
of Wall Street, which saw business being drawn away from the exchanges by the various
proprietary electronic communications networks where trades could be executed more quickly and
cheaply than on the NYSE. See Robert Sales, The Quest to Kill 390, WALL ST. & TECH.,
Dec. 1999, at 37, 37 (contending that executives of the largest broker-dealers on Wall Street had all
vocalized opposition to Rule 390). By then, Rule 390 covered only 30% of the NYSE-listed issuers
who represented approximately half of the exchange’s volume. Id. at 38.

2012]

The Emperor Has No Clothes

1843

traded exclusively on the NYSE and those that were traded in multiple
venues, including the NYSE.
More recently, the SEC purposely created a climate for a natural
experiment when, in May 2005, it commenced a pilot program whereby onethird of the Russell 3000 Index constituent stocks with high levels of
liquidity were exempted from the Uptick Rule.177 The Uptick Rule, former
Exchange Act Rule 10a-1, was designed to prevent short sellers from
accelerating a declining market by providing that a listed security might be
sold short only at either a price above where the immediately preceding sale
was effected (the plus tick) or at the last price if it was higher than the last
different price (zero-plus tick).178 With very limited exceptions, short sales
were prohibited on the minus tick or zero-minus ticks. Collectively these are
known as the Uptick Rule.179
Both Rule 19c-3 and the pilot program preceded significant changes in
the operating rules of trading markets. The Uptick Rule had been a feature of
American securities regulatory policy since 1938;180 the bar to off-board
trading has an even longer history, since exchanges historically embodied
this anticompetitive feature.181 Thus, the SEC, perhaps timidly, but certainly
wisely, tested the waters before launching those reform efforts. This not only
made good politics, but made better-informed regulatory policy.
The most obvious benefit of staging is that it informs the ultimately
embraced regulatory policy. The SEC’s actions with both Rule 19c-3 and the
pilot program created a natural experiment by which the impact of differing

177. See Short Sales, Exchange Act Release No. 50,103, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,008, 48,012–13
(Aug. 6, 2004) (adopting proposed rule 202T, allowing the SEC to establish a pilot program “to
suspend any short sale price test for such securities and for such time periods as the Commission
deems necessary or appropriate”). The one-third were chosen by selecting every third company on
a list, starting with the second company. Lynn Bai, The Uptick Rule of Short Sale Regulation: Can
It Alleviate Downward Price Pressure from Negative Earnings Shocks?, 5 RUTGERS BUS. L.J. 1, 11
(2008). This provided a control group of the companies not included in the pilot study sample. Id.
at 5.
178. For an overview of the history of the Uptick Rule, see generally Charles M. Jones,
Shorting Restrictions: Revisiting the 1930s, 47 FIN. REV. 1 (2012).
179. See Jonathan R. Macey et al., Restrictions on Short Sales: An Analysis of the Uptick Rule
and Its Role in View of the October 1987 Stock Market Crash, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 799, 800–01
(1989) (“The uptick rule, Rule 10a-1, implemented in the wake of the 1929 crash and changed only
slightly since then, states that a ‘short sale can only occur at a price above (“price tick”) the
immediate sale price, or at a price equal to the price of the most immediate sale if the most recent
price change was positive.’”). For critics of the revisions to the Uptick Rule, see generally David P.
McCaffrey, Review of the Policy Debate over Short Sale Regulation During the Market Crisis, 73
ALB. L. REV. 483 (2010); Melissa W. Palombo, Note, The Short-Changing of Investors: Why a
Short Sale Price Test Rule Is Necessary in Today’s Markets, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1447 (2010).
180. Charles R. Schwab, Restore the Uptick Rule, Restore Confidence, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9,
2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122878208553589809.html.
181. See ROBERT A. SCHWARTZ, MICRO MARKETS: A MARKET STRUCTURE APPROACH TO
MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 386 (2010) (“Fixed commissions and off-board trading restrictions
were established by an accord known as the Buttonwood Tree Agreement that was signed by 24
securities brokers on May 17, 1792 . . . .”).
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regulatory treatments could be empirically tested.182 Not only did this make
the careers of many an academic (for whom the currency of the realm is a
working paper focused on the econometric analysis of a real problem), but
that work produced valuable input to the regulator, and free of charge. To be
sure, the SEC has a very able and relatively well-supported group of
economists who regularly opine on the costs and benefits of a proposed rule.
But, one empirical study rarely can be expected to reflect the full field of
possible inputs on a matter. The SEC’s budget is limited in the number of
studies it can launch, and the internal time constraints for the agency to
consider a single issue all weigh in favor of creating an environment for
others to carry out the empirical inquiry, inviting the assistance of tenureand chair-bound empiricists.
Staging has another virtue, particularly when the initiative is something
of a paradigm shift, like the governance proposals at issue in Chamber of
Commerce. Staging fosters an environment where much more information
will be at hand before the final regulatory step is taken. Moreover, moving
forward cautiously with a pilot group of firms is most consistent with the
“consider” standard, since that strategy is designed to better inform the
agency of the expected costs and benefits of moving forward.
As discussed earlier, costs loom large in the regulatory quilt because
they are more tangible and because the cost part of the regulatory equation
poses few doubts about correlation versus causation.183 Assessing benefits is
quite the opposite, particularly ex ante. Ex parte research on both of these
might well be seen as more credible, and what is observed ex post is likely to
be received as even more credible than what is conjectured ex ante. Discrete
staging allows evidence to be gathered as to costs, and allows the researcher
to gather information as to the probable benefits as well.

182. E.g., Bai, supra note 177 (conducting an empirical analysis of the effects of the Uptick
Rule); Kalman J. Cohen & Robert M. Conroy, An Empirical Study of the Effect of Rule 19c-3, 33
J.L. & ECON. 277 (1990) (studying the effects of Rule 19c-3); Karl B. Diether et al., It’s SHO Time!
Short-Sale Price Tests and Market Quality, 64 J. FIN. 37 (2009) (examining the effects of the
suspension of short-sale price tests). The SEC also studied the effects of the experiment. E.g., DIV.
MKT. REGULATION, U.S. SEC, Study III: Market Fragmentation, Competition, and Regulation, in
SEC MARKET 2000: AN EXAMINATION OF CURRENT EQUITY MARKET DEVELOPMENTS III-10
(1994) (finding a “limited amount of internalization” resulting from the removal of some off-board
restrictions and concluding that the Division was “not surprise[d] that studies both have failed to
show a strong negative effect from Rule 19c-3 or strong evidence that the additional competition in
these stocks has appreciably improved their markets”); OFFICE OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. SEC,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE SHORT SALE PRICE RESTRICTIONS UNDER THE REGULATION SHO
PILOT 4–5 (2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2007/regshopilot020607.pdf
(analyzing the economic impact of the SHO pilot).
183. See supra notes 163–164 and accompanying text.
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Can the Public Interest Be Scaled?

Regulatory initiatives are frequently confronted by the complaint that
“one size does not fit all.”184 The complaint in fact seeks scaling regulation,
so that larger and more complicated firms are subject to requirements that are
different from those of smaller, less complex business organizations. In the
securities regulation area, scaling is typically associated with more regulation
for bigger firms and less for smaller firms.185 Moreover, several initiatives
embraced by the Dodd-Frank Act expressly call on the SEC, when issuing
rules pursuant to the Act’s provisions, to consider whether the burdens would
be disproportionately greater on smaller companies.
There are at least a couple of reasons why regulation, particularly
disclosure-oriented regulation, might pose greater burdens on smaller
companies than larger ones. First, financial reporting, and indeed, a good
deal of regulation generally, has a high fixed-cost component, so that a
substantial part of the cost of compliance is invariant, or nearly so, to firm
size and complexity. Second, firms that are large in terms of their total assets
or revenues frequently involve complex organization structures and have
operations in multiple locations that are sometimes on different continents.
Complexity poses its own challenges to the efficacy of the firm’s reporting
system so that greater attention to the internal financial controls is necessary.
In contrast, in a smaller, less complex entity, the senior management has a
greater awareness of daily operations so that there is less need for the
procedures employed in larger, more complex organizations for protecting
the integrity of internal financial reporting. Thus, a few of the disclosure
demands in SEC Regulation S-K, for example, are less demanding for
smaller companies than for larger ones.186 On the other hand, SEC rules
184. See Amy Feldman, Surviving Sarbanes-Oxley, INC. MAG., Sept. 2005, at 132, 137 (“Many
observers believe there ought to be different rules for companies of different sizes, or at least clearer
guidelines on how small companies should apply the rules.”); Public statement from Marshall E.
Blume & Chester S. Spratt, Shadow Fin. Regulatory Comm., The Equity Markets: One Size Does
Not Fit All (Feb. 22, 2010), available at
http://www.aei.org/files/2010/02/22/Statement%20No.%20287.pdf (reviewing the SEC’s proposed
rules, and noting that “the trades of small retail investors and institutional investors are
fundamentally different and should not be viewed as interchangeable”).
185. See Troy A. Paredes, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Twelfth Annual A.A.
Sommer, Jr. Lecture on Corporate, Securities and Financial Law (Oct. 27, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch102711tap.htm (“[T]he federal securities laws have long
recognized the need to be measured, as there is a tradition of scaling federal securities regulation in
important respects to provide small businesses relief from select burdens that may be especially
onerous for them.”).
186. E.g., 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(h) (2011) (setting out lesser reporting obligations); id. at
§ 229.201(e) (allowing for the election of an appropriate index to use in the preparation of reports);
id. at § 229.303(a) (“[T]he discussion shall focus on each relevant, reportable segment or other
subdivision of the business and on the registrant as a whole.”). Most recently, Dodd-Frank excused
non-accelerated filers, those with a market capitalization (excluding shares of affiliates) less than
$75 million from the auditor attestation of management’s assessment of internal controls. See Press
Release, American Accounting Association, Reviled Though It Has Been, Sarbanes-Oxley’s
Section 404 Substantially Reduces Corporate Financial Misstatements, Study Finds (Nov. 16,
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grant many regulatory dispensations to very large companies because their
shares are believed to trade in deep markets, with broad analyst coverage,
and with significant institutional ownership.187 Hence, there is a history of
scaling of regulation under the federal securities laws.
Scaling regulation so as to provide important dispensations to smaller
companies immediately confronts serious public interest concerns because
studies continue to reflect, as captured above, that there is a higher frequency
of financial fraud and, more generally, reporting weaknesses in smaller
companies than in larger companies. That is, reporting problems are in a
sense reverse-scaled. Small companies pose a greater frequency of risk to
investors than do larger companies. Nonetheless, scaling has to some extent
the same virtues as staging. Each allows something of a test period before
standards are imposed. In the case of small issuers, they enjoy lightened
regulation until more is learned about whether their regulatory burdens
should be increased. Scaling also communicates not just deliberateness on
the part of the SEC, but discreteness that is consistent with the Review
Standard. With both staging and scaling, regulation would be more
evolutionary, which should have its positive impact when a staged or scaled
rule is challenged under the Review Standard.
V.

Conclusion

So what to make of the mischief of Chamber of Commerce and Business
Roundtable? Their author has now left the bench, but the issue remains: how
close a review is the court to undertake of SEC rules? As matters now stand,
a good deal of uncertainty surrounds any SEC rulemaking that engenders the
ire of the regulated. Indeed, we repeatedly hear the rattling of appellatereview sabers by industry groups.188 We have gone to some effort to make

2010), available at http://aaahq.org/newsroom/Sarbanes-Oxley%27sSection404.htm (“[T]his year’s
Dodd-Frank financial-reform bill permanently exempts companies with less than $75-million
capitalization from a key provision of 404 that requires an outside auditor to attest annually to
firms’ internal-control evaluations.”).
187. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10(f), .101(h), .301(c), .407(g) (2011) (reducing or eliminating
many of Regulation S-K’s reporting requirements for smaller companies); Securities Offering
Reform, Securities Act Release No. 8501, Exchange Act Release No. 50,624, Investment Company
Act Release No. 26,649, 69 Fed. Reg. 67,392, 67,396–97 (proposed Nov. 17, 2004) (codified as
amended at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 230, 239, 240, 243 and 274) (justifying the SEC’s decision to
provide large companies (well-known seasoned issuers) with greater disclosure and registration
flexibility by stating that issuers with high levels of market capitalization also tend to have high
levels of analyst coverage and institutional ownership, and, thus, high levels of market scrutiny);
Daniel J. Morrissey, The Securities Act at Its Diamond Jubilee: Renewing the Case for a Robust
Registration Requirement, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 749, 763 (2009) (observing that the SEC rules give
large companies (seasoned issuers and well-known seasoned issuers) more freedom to conduct
offering activity during the registration process).
188. See, e.g., Groups, Stressing Economic Impact, Ask SEC to Host Roundtable on Pay Ratio
Rulemaking, 44 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 153 (2012) (detailing the requests for the SEC to better
consider economic impact in conducting pay-ratio rulemaking); Yin Wilczek, Democratic
Lawmakers Urge SEC to Adopt ‘Strong’ Resource Extraction Disclosure Rule, 44 SEC. REG. & L.
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the point that Congress and the Supreme Court do not support the reasoning
in either of these opinions. The strategies advanced in Part IV may smooth
the path in future regulatory efforts. We are hopeful that the course of action
we counsel, particularly that of staging and scaling, will be more than a mild
palliative. We also believe the purposes of our suggestions are broader than
sliding a rule past the D.C. Circuit; we believe each of the suggestions will
lead to better regulations. With regulation anchored in the protection of
investors and the public interest, much more is at stake in SEC rulemaking
than just getting approval of the D.C. Circuit. But those greater goals depend
on surviving a challenge to the rule the SEC has crafted to serve the public
interest.

REP. 256 (2012) (reporting that American Petroleum Institute’s comment letter was a roadmap for
appellate review if the SEC adopts any rules related to carrying out the Dodd-Frank mandate for
disclosures related to payments made by exploration companies to foreign governments); Yin
Wilczek, Industry Calls on SEC to Re-Assess Economic Impact of Conflict Minerals Rule, 43 SEC.
REG. & L. REP. 2256 (2011) (speculating that despite a statutory mandate the SEC would face stiff
challenges with the new rule related to conflict minerals mandated by Dodd-Frank).

